Kenya says it's not behind blasts in Somali town
A military spokesman says Kenya was not behind strong explosions heard in a Somali town that is on a target list published by Kenya's military.
Resident Habiba Nur said Monday he heard four explosions Sunday night in the town of Afgoi, 20 miles (30 kilometers) north of the capital, Mogadishu. Ali Sheik Muhudin, another resident, said the blasts appeared to be near a militant base.
Kenyan troops moved into Somalia last month in pursuit of al-Shabab militants. Kenya's military spokesman, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, said Kenya was not responsible for the blasts in Afgoi, though he said they came during an al-Shabab meeting.
Afgoi was on a target list of towns Chirchir published Nov. 1.
Al-Shabab denied Afgoi had been bombed.
Monday, November 14, 2011
Kenya’s Political Failure in Southern Somalia
Kenya's Political Failure in Southern Somalia
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Monday, November 14, 2011
Kenya's military operation in Somalia is a warning sign for the Somali people of the most probable political future that they will undergo: the partition of the territories of post-independence Somalia into a group of weak authorities that are beholden to neighboring states (Ethiopia and Kenya) that act for their own interests and as proxies for great external powers (United States, Western European states, and, increasingly, China).
For the first time since the collapse of SiadBarre's dictatorship in 1991, there is a strong possibility that "Somalia," which has existed in political limbo for twenty years, with decisions on its political organization on hold and deferred, will take on a more settled political definition. That settlement would be imposed by external powers using the tactic of divide and rule to create dependent client states, loosely based on dominant clans inhabiting Somalia's regions. It is obvious that were that scenario to eventuate it would spell the end of any possibility that the Somali people could regain their self-determination and be able to defend their own interests on the international stage.
The partition of post-independence Somalia would not mean the end of the Somali people. Regardless of political organization, Somalis would continue to acknowledge one another as Somalis, as distinct from other peoples and ethnic groups. Somalis would simply lack an organ for articulating and asserting their interests. That, of course, would systematically disadvantage them in the competitive world of international politics. Partition would be a form of neo-colonialism. It would mean that the Somali people would be permanently weakened and they would not make the decisions determining their fate. Loss of self-determination is not death; it is dependency.
The Kenyan military operation is, to repeat, a warning sign of what is likely to come; as it has worked out thus far, the operation is not clearly an exercise in partition, it simply tends in that direction – but that is due to Kenyan incompetence rather than to Somali resolve. The basic dynamic remains in place.
The Geo-Political Dimension of Kenya's Operation
The most frustrating feature of Kenya's military operation from the viewpoint of analyzing it is the Kenyan government's lack of clarity in defining the operation's geo-political aims. At different times, from different officials, and sometimes in the same statement, the aim of the operation is said to be to secure Kenya's borders, to create buffer zones in Somalia around its border,and to effect regime change in the regions of southern Somalia by eliminating the administrations of the Islamist Harakat al-ShabaabMujahideen (H.S.M.). Only the third alternative would involve (and necessarily so) Kenya in creating a political organization for the south, which it does not appear to be ready or able to do. Yet, Kenya keeps promising to press on to Kismayo, H.S.M.'s nerve center.
What seems to be the case is that Kenya has the maximum aim of carving out a client statelet for itself in southern Somalia and the minimum aim of border security, and that its operative aims fall between the two extremes, varying day by day depending on how the operation is faring. The maximum aim is Kenya's wish (partition); the minimum aim is the last eventuality before failure. Nairobi does not seem to have figured out what it can reasonably expect to get with the resources it is willing to expend, which – if true – indicates that the operation is ill-conceived.
The lack of clarity and focus in Kenya's geo-political aims shows that its operation was premature, that it failed to formulate a coherent political plan for southern Somalia, and, more importantly, did not do the work necessary to bring together the Somali political factions in the south that oppose H.S.M. Nairobi has put itself in the position in which the United States found itself after it invaded Iraq, with all the political work left to do on the ground. Yet Nairobi is not Washington: Kenya does not have the resources of a super-power.
It is not to be expected that Kenya will come anywhere near realizing its maximum aim, yet it is worthwhile considering Nairobi's dream as indicative of the underlying tendency shaping Somalia's political future.
On October 30, the Kenyan newspaper The East African published a suggestive article based on "diplomatic and intelligence sources" about the grand strategy of Somali's neighboring states. The first step of the strategy would be to create three "areas of influence" in the central and southern regions that would provide "buffer zones" for Ethiopia and Kenya. One area of influence would comprise most of central Somalia and would fall under Ethiopian control, another would cover most of the south and would be in Kenya's charge, and the third would comprehend Mogadishu and adjacent areas, and would be controlled by the African Union peacekeeping mission, AMISOM. Each of the areas of influence would be governed by Somali clients as a "semi-autonomous state" that could become part of a "federal Somalia" at some later date. That is what partition would look like.
The second step of the strategy escapes into fantasy. All "liberated areas" would be turned over to AMISOM, a move that would require that the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) increase the mission's forces to 20,000 from the current 8-10,000 (and that the Western "donor"-powers pay for the expanded force). Finally, AMISOM would "hand over a pacified Somalia" to the U.N. That is all very unlikely to happen (to say the least) – it would be partition under ideal conditions for Ethiopia and Kenya. The "donor"-powers have not bought into it, nor has the U.N. Kenya is faced with more immediate and messy problems.
Kenya's role in the grand strategy is to organize a "Jubbaland" state controlling the deep south – the Gedo, Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba regions. According to the East African, the Kenyan government had not decided who would front for it. Among the contenders are Kenya's protégé, Mohamed Gandi, who leads the Azania state backed by Nairobi and Paris; Sh. Ahmed Madobe, the head of theRasKamboni organization that broke with H.S.M. and opposes it; and local officials and forces affiliated with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which has formal international backing. Kenya is working with all three groups, but has done nothing to reconcile them. According to the East African, Kenya's intelligence establishment is behind Azania, whereas Kenya's military is behind the RasKamboni organization, which can "raise an army."
On November 7, Great Britain's Guardian newspaper published a strategy article similar to the East African's piece. According to the Guardian's sources, the Azania forces, which were most dependent on Kenya and were its favorites, had "not lived up to expectations" and were opposed by Ethiopia, because of Azania's clan base – the Ogaden, which populate Ethiopia's Somali region and harbor an insurgent movement against Addis Ababa. The demotion of Azania, according to the Guardian, leaves Kenya with the Marehan clan and the RasKamboni organization. The Guardian added that in order to avoid having to get caught in the web of clan and factional politics, Nairobi was hoping that AMISOM would deploy to Ksmayo and that Kenya would join the peacekeeping mission.
The East African and Guardian articles indicate that Kenya will not be capable of executing a partition strategy due to Nairobi's political incompetence – its failure to deal with southern Somalia's factionalization (if that is possible for an external actor to accomplish). That failure became evident when the T.F.G. resisted the "Jubbaland" project and apparently succeeded in rolling it back.
The T.F.G. Resists Kenya
From the outset of Kenya's operation in mid-October it was clear that Nairobi had not prepared a political strategy to accompany the military mission. On October 18, the Nairobi Star reported that Kenya had trained administrators to take over "liberated towns." That did not prove to be the case. On October 19, Kenyan army spokesman Lt. Nyagah told the press that Kenya was leaving the towns it captured in the hands of "T.F.G. forces and local administrations." According to Nyagah, Nairobi had no intention of occupying southern Somalia, but only wished to "flush out" H.S.M.
It also appeared that Nairobi had failed to inform the T.F.G. of its operation beforehand and, consequently, had not gained the T.F.G.'s cooperation. Whatever the reason was for Nairobi's lapse, the T.F.G., which formally represents all the territories of post-independence Somalia (although it effectively controls almost none of them), stood to lose the most from partition in the south, which would create a statelet challenging the T.F.G.'s representation.
By October 17, T.F.G. officials were opposing Kenya's operation as a violation of Somali sovereignty. Somalia's U.N. ambassador, Omar Jamal, for example, called the operation "a serious territorial intrusion." On the other hand, Nairobi found backing on the ground from T.F.G.-allied forces in the south; military commander, Abdi Yusuf, said that "Kenya is fully supporting us militarily."
Expressions of opposition to Kenya's operation by T.F.G. officials spurred Nairobi to send a delegation to Mogadishu led by foreign minister, Moses Wetang'ula, and defense minister, Yusuf Haji, to gain approval for and cooperation with the operation from the T.F.G. After Kenya's delegation met with the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, the two sides issued a joint communiqué on October 18, in which the T.F.G. appeared to acquiesce in the operation.
The agreement, however, did not hold; on October 24, Sh. Sharif came out against Kenya's "military incursion," telling Nairobi that its training of and logistical support for anti-H.S.M. Somali forces was welcome, "but not your army."
Sh. Sharif's statement created a diplomatic problem and embarrassment for Kenya, which quickly asked for "clarification" of the T.F.G.'s position towards the operation. On October 26, the T.F.G.'s defense minister, Hussein Arab Isse, issued a "clarification statement" in which the T.F.G. denied that there had been any agreement allowing Kenyan forces into Somalia," but said that the two sides had now agreed on "cooperation in undertaking coordinated security and military operations spearheaded by T.F.G. soldiers trained by the Kenyan government." The T.F.G. also said it would appoint a "joint security committee to work with Kenya."
The "clarification statement" did not give Nairobi the endorsement that it wanted from the T.F.G., yet, on October 26, Nairobi went to the U.N.S.C. to justify its operation, claiming that it had acted "in direct consultation and liaison with the T.F.G. in Mogadishu," which appears to have been anything but the case. Also on October 26, the U.S. State Department said that Washington did not "encourage the Kenyan government to act nor did Kenya seek our views."
With domestic Somali and international actors distancing themselves from the operation, Nairobi made another effort to get the T.F.G. on board in a meeting between T.F.G. prime minister Abdiweli Gas and Kenya's prime minister RailaOdinga that resulted in a new communiqué, the core of which was an expression of the T.F.G.'s support for the operation in return for Kenya's assent to the T.F.G.'s leadership of operations with Kenyan support.
(It must be said that nobody expects Kenya to surrender control of its operation to the T.F.G.; the communique's provisions serve the political purpose of subordinating Kenya to the T.F.G. in a purely formal sense. That is sufficient, however, to block a Kenyan attempt at partition.)
After the communiqué was issued, Odinga stated that Nairobi did not support "the creation of an autonomous region in Jubbaland; we support the creation of local administrations." Partition appeared to have been taken off the table, for the time being. It remains to be seen what might replace H.S.M. – if, indeed, it is displaced – except "local administrations." Nairobi has been proved to have had no operative political strategy.
Conclusion
As it looks ever less probable that the U.N.-managed "transition" of Somalia to a permanent constitutional state will succeed, the alternative remains partition, balkanization, cantonization.
Kenya's operation in Somalia might have been the beginning of the partition process had it not been for Nairobi's political incompetence. In a perceptive analysis on October 31, the Indian Ocean Newsletter put it succinctly: Nairobi had succeeded in rubbing the "nationalism of some T.F.G. leaders the wrong way," and "had not convinced the West that its aims are realistic."
In terms of realizing its geo-political interests, Nairobi acted prematurely. It did not have a political order in place to take over from H.S.M. and, as an alternative to that, it did not gain the cooperation of the T.F.G. Nairobi also did not get the "donor"-powers on board, failing to realize that they have not yet abandoned the "transition" process in favor of partition.
Balkanization will become operative when and if the "donor"-powers definitively give up on a state embracing the territories of post-independence Somalia, or most of them – perhaps excluding Somaliland.
Kenya's operation is a geo-political warning sign of partition, not the thing itself. Nairobi acted against the "transition" process and its "roadmap." It isolated itself diplomatically and did not win whole-hearted support anywhere. It had no operative political plan. It did everything wrong politically. Nairobi cannot hope to provide a political formula for southern Somalia. Presumably, there will be another day.
________________________________
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Monday, November 14, 2011
Kenya's military operation in Somalia is a warning sign for the Somali people of the most probable political future that they will undergo: the partition of the territories of post-independence Somalia into a group of weak authorities that are beholden to neighboring states (Ethiopia and Kenya) that act for their own interests and as proxies for great external powers (United States, Western European states, and, increasingly, China).
For the first time since the collapse of SiadBarre's dictatorship in 1991, there is a strong possibility that "Somalia," which has existed in political limbo for twenty years, with decisions on its political organization on hold and deferred, will take on a more settled political definition. That settlement would be imposed by external powers using the tactic of divide and rule to create dependent client states, loosely based on dominant clans inhabiting Somalia's regions. It is obvious that were that scenario to eventuate it would spell the end of any possibility that the Somali people could regain their self-determination and be able to defend their own interests on the international stage.
The partition of post-independence Somalia would not mean the end of the Somali people. Regardless of political organization, Somalis would continue to acknowledge one another as Somalis, as distinct from other peoples and ethnic groups. Somalis would simply lack an organ for articulating and asserting their interests. That, of course, would systematically disadvantage them in the competitive world of international politics. Partition would be a form of neo-colonialism. It would mean that the Somali people would be permanently weakened and they would not make the decisions determining their fate. Loss of self-determination is not death; it is dependency.
The Kenyan military operation is, to repeat, a warning sign of what is likely to come; as it has worked out thus far, the operation is not clearly an exercise in partition, it simply tends in that direction – but that is due to Kenyan incompetence rather than to Somali resolve. The basic dynamic remains in place.
The Geo-Political Dimension of Kenya's Operation
The most frustrating feature of Kenya's military operation from the viewpoint of analyzing it is the Kenyan government's lack of clarity in defining the operation's geo-political aims. At different times, from different officials, and sometimes in the same statement, the aim of the operation is said to be to secure Kenya's borders, to create buffer zones in Somalia around its border,and to effect regime change in the regions of southern Somalia by eliminating the administrations of the Islamist Harakat al-ShabaabMujahideen (H.S.M.). Only the third alternative would involve (and necessarily so) Kenya in creating a political organization for the south, which it does not appear to be ready or able to do. Yet, Kenya keeps promising to press on to Kismayo, H.S.M.'s nerve center.
What seems to be the case is that Kenya has the maximum aim of carving out a client statelet for itself in southern Somalia and the minimum aim of border security, and that its operative aims fall between the two extremes, varying day by day depending on how the operation is faring. The maximum aim is Kenya's wish (partition); the minimum aim is the last eventuality before failure. Nairobi does not seem to have figured out what it can reasonably expect to get with the resources it is willing to expend, which – if true – indicates that the operation is ill-conceived.
The lack of clarity and focus in Kenya's geo-political aims shows that its operation was premature, that it failed to formulate a coherent political plan for southern Somalia, and, more importantly, did not do the work necessary to bring together the Somali political factions in the south that oppose H.S.M. Nairobi has put itself in the position in which the United States found itself after it invaded Iraq, with all the political work left to do on the ground. Yet Nairobi is not Washington: Kenya does not have the resources of a super-power.
It is not to be expected that Kenya will come anywhere near realizing its maximum aim, yet it is worthwhile considering Nairobi's dream as indicative of the underlying tendency shaping Somalia's political future.
On October 30, the Kenyan newspaper The East African published a suggestive article based on "diplomatic and intelligence sources" about the grand strategy of Somali's neighboring states. The first step of the strategy would be to create three "areas of influence" in the central and southern regions that would provide "buffer zones" for Ethiopia and Kenya. One area of influence would comprise most of central Somalia and would fall under Ethiopian control, another would cover most of the south and would be in Kenya's charge, and the third would comprehend Mogadishu and adjacent areas, and would be controlled by the African Union peacekeeping mission, AMISOM. Each of the areas of influence would be governed by Somali clients as a "semi-autonomous state" that could become part of a "federal Somalia" at some later date. That is what partition would look like.
The second step of the strategy escapes into fantasy. All "liberated areas" would be turned over to AMISOM, a move that would require that the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) increase the mission's forces to 20,000 from the current 8-10,000 (and that the Western "donor"-powers pay for the expanded force). Finally, AMISOM would "hand over a pacified Somalia" to the U.N. That is all very unlikely to happen (to say the least) – it would be partition under ideal conditions for Ethiopia and Kenya. The "donor"-powers have not bought into it, nor has the U.N. Kenya is faced with more immediate and messy problems.
Kenya's role in the grand strategy is to organize a "Jubbaland" state controlling the deep south – the Gedo, Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba regions. According to the East African, the Kenyan government had not decided who would front for it. Among the contenders are Kenya's protégé, Mohamed Gandi, who leads the Azania state backed by Nairobi and Paris; Sh. Ahmed Madobe, the head of theRasKamboni organization that broke with H.S.M. and opposes it; and local officials and forces affiliated with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which has formal international backing. Kenya is working with all three groups, but has done nothing to reconcile them. According to the East African, Kenya's intelligence establishment is behind Azania, whereas Kenya's military is behind the RasKamboni organization, which can "raise an army."
On November 7, Great Britain's Guardian newspaper published a strategy article similar to the East African's piece. According to the Guardian's sources, the Azania forces, which were most dependent on Kenya and were its favorites, had "not lived up to expectations" and were opposed by Ethiopia, because of Azania's clan base – the Ogaden, which populate Ethiopia's Somali region and harbor an insurgent movement against Addis Ababa. The demotion of Azania, according to the Guardian, leaves Kenya with the Marehan clan and the RasKamboni organization. The Guardian added that in order to avoid having to get caught in the web of clan and factional politics, Nairobi was hoping that AMISOM would deploy to Ksmayo and that Kenya would join the peacekeeping mission.
The East African and Guardian articles indicate that Kenya will not be capable of executing a partition strategy due to Nairobi's political incompetence – its failure to deal with southern Somalia's factionalization (if that is possible for an external actor to accomplish). That failure became evident when the T.F.G. resisted the "Jubbaland" project and apparently succeeded in rolling it back.
The T.F.G. Resists Kenya
From the outset of Kenya's operation in mid-October it was clear that Nairobi had not prepared a political strategy to accompany the military mission. On October 18, the Nairobi Star reported that Kenya had trained administrators to take over "liberated towns." That did not prove to be the case. On October 19, Kenyan army spokesman Lt. Nyagah told the press that Kenya was leaving the towns it captured in the hands of "T.F.G. forces and local administrations." According to Nyagah, Nairobi had no intention of occupying southern Somalia, but only wished to "flush out" H.S.M.
It also appeared that Nairobi had failed to inform the T.F.G. of its operation beforehand and, consequently, had not gained the T.F.G.'s cooperation. Whatever the reason was for Nairobi's lapse, the T.F.G., which formally represents all the territories of post-independence Somalia (although it effectively controls almost none of them), stood to lose the most from partition in the south, which would create a statelet challenging the T.F.G.'s representation.
By October 17, T.F.G. officials were opposing Kenya's operation as a violation of Somali sovereignty. Somalia's U.N. ambassador, Omar Jamal, for example, called the operation "a serious territorial intrusion." On the other hand, Nairobi found backing on the ground from T.F.G.-allied forces in the south; military commander, Abdi Yusuf, said that "Kenya is fully supporting us militarily."
Expressions of opposition to Kenya's operation by T.F.G. officials spurred Nairobi to send a delegation to Mogadishu led by foreign minister, Moses Wetang'ula, and defense minister, Yusuf Haji, to gain approval for and cooperation with the operation from the T.F.G. After Kenya's delegation met with the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, the two sides issued a joint communiqué on October 18, in which the T.F.G. appeared to acquiesce in the operation.
The agreement, however, did not hold; on October 24, Sh. Sharif came out against Kenya's "military incursion," telling Nairobi that its training of and logistical support for anti-H.S.M. Somali forces was welcome, "but not your army."
Sh. Sharif's statement created a diplomatic problem and embarrassment for Kenya, which quickly asked for "clarification" of the T.F.G.'s position towards the operation. On October 26, the T.F.G.'s defense minister, Hussein Arab Isse, issued a "clarification statement" in which the T.F.G. denied that there had been any agreement allowing Kenyan forces into Somalia," but said that the two sides had now agreed on "cooperation in undertaking coordinated security and military operations spearheaded by T.F.G. soldiers trained by the Kenyan government." The T.F.G. also said it would appoint a "joint security committee to work with Kenya."
The "clarification statement" did not give Nairobi the endorsement that it wanted from the T.F.G., yet, on October 26, Nairobi went to the U.N.S.C. to justify its operation, claiming that it had acted "in direct consultation and liaison with the T.F.G. in Mogadishu," which appears to have been anything but the case. Also on October 26, the U.S. State Department said that Washington did not "encourage the Kenyan government to act nor did Kenya seek our views."
With domestic Somali and international actors distancing themselves from the operation, Nairobi made another effort to get the T.F.G. on board in a meeting between T.F.G. prime minister Abdiweli Gas and Kenya's prime minister RailaOdinga that resulted in a new communiqué, the core of which was an expression of the T.F.G.'s support for the operation in return for Kenya's assent to the T.F.G.'s leadership of operations with Kenyan support.
(It must be said that nobody expects Kenya to surrender control of its operation to the T.F.G.; the communique's provisions serve the political purpose of subordinating Kenya to the T.F.G. in a purely formal sense. That is sufficient, however, to block a Kenyan attempt at partition.)
After the communiqué was issued, Odinga stated that Nairobi did not support "the creation of an autonomous region in Jubbaland; we support the creation of local administrations." Partition appeared to have been taken off the table, for the time being. It remains to be seen what might replace H.S.M. – if, indeed, it is displaced – except "local administrations." Nairobi has been proved to have had no operative political strategy.
Conclusion
As it looks ever less probable that the U.N.-managed "transition" of Somalia to a permanent constitutional state will succeed, the alternative remains partition, balkanization, cantonization.
Kenya's operation in Somalia might have been the beginning of the partition process had it not been for Nairobi's political incompetence. In a perceptive analysis on October 31, the Indian Ocean Newsletter put it succinctly: Nairobi had succeeded in rubbing the "nationalism of some T.F.G. leaders the wrong way," and "had not convinced the West that its aims are realistic."
In terms of realizing its geo-political interests, Nairobi acted prematurely. It did not have a political order in place to take over from H.S.M. and, as an alternative to that, it did not gain the cooperation of the T.F.G. Nairobi also did not get the "donor"-powers on board, failing to realize that they have not yet abandoned the "transition" process in favor of partition.
Balkanization will become operative when and if the "donor"-powers definitively give up on a state embracing the territories of post-independence Somalia, or most of them – perhaps excluding Somaliland.
Kenya's operation is a geo-political warning sign of partition, not the thing itself. Nairobi acted against the "transition" process and its "roadmap." It isolated itself diplomatically and did not win whole-hearted support anywhere. It had no operative political plan. It did everything wrong politically. Nairobi cannot hope to provide a political formula for southern Somalia. Presumably, there will be another day.
________________________________
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in
Saturday, November 12, 2011
Magacyada Xildhibaanadii U Codeeyay In Bilaa Diiwaangalin Lagu Galo Doorashada
Magacyada Xildhibaanadii U Codeeyay In Bilaa Diiwaangalin Lagu Galo Doorashada Golayaasha Deegaanka Ee Golahana Ku Sandulyeeyay In La Laalo Diiwaangalintii Codbixiyayaasha
Hargeysa, November 11, 2011 (Haatuf) - Xildhibaanada golaha wakiilada Somaliland oo isugu jira kuwo dayacay xilkii loo soo doortay, kuwo aan garanayn masuuliyada xilka sharci dajineed ee ummada ay u hayaan iyo xubno tiro yar oo iyagu inta badan dadkii soo doortay xidhiidh toos ah la leh, ayaa hadana waxa jira xubno iyagu aan isku kalsoonayn oo inta badan ajandaha ay u codaynayaan ama ka codaynayaan aan aqoon-ba u lahayn, balse halka codku u badan yahay uun gacanta u taaga, iyagoo ay sidoo kalena jiraan xubno xilliyada codaynta lagu yidhaahdo hebaloow gacanta taag, taas darteedna hugunka uun raaca.
Waxa kale oo jira mudanayaal dooda ay ka dhiibtaan ajande ama xeer golaha la soo hordhigo, oo iyagu doodooda ku duray qodobo ku jira ajandahaasi ay dureen hadana maalinta codka loo qaadayo mooshinkaasi ama ajandahaasi ansixintiisa labada gacmoodba u taaga, iyadoo aanay jirin wax isbadala oo lagu sameeyay ajanadihii uu doodiisa ku duray. Arrimahaasina waxay ka mid yihiin hab-dhaqanada xilgudashada golaha Wakiilada curyaamiyay ee keenay in caadifad dedeg ah wax lagu laalo ama lagu meelmariyo.
Go'aanka doraad golaha Wakiiladu ay ku laaleen diiwaangalintii codbixiyayaasha ee lagu galay doorashadii Madaxtooyada ee dalka ka qabsoontay 26-June 2011-kii, oo golaha ay ku soo hordhigeen mooshin koox mudanayaal ah oo soo jeediyay in wax ka badal iyo kaabis lagu sameeyo xeerkii diiwaangalinta codbixiyayaasha xeer Lr. 3/2008-dii, isla markaana la laalo diiwaangalintii hore lana sameeyo diiwaangalin cusub, ayaa waxa ka mid ahaa 34 mudane ee golaha ku sanduleeyay go'aanka lagu laalay diiwaangalinta ee madasha fadhigaasi doraad u codeeyay in bilaa diiwaangalin lagu galo doorashada deegaanada:-
-
C/qaadir Ismaaciil Jirde
Maxamed Saalax Cige
Maxamed Jaamac Cabdi
C/raxmaan Maxamed Jaamac (Xoog)
C/qaadir Jaamac Xaamud
-
Jaamac Xasan Aadan
Xasan Cawaale Caynaan
Muuse Maxamed Ismaaciil (Hoos u jeed)
Saleebaan Cawad Cali (Bukhaari)
10. Axmed Barkhad Obsiiye
11. Axmed Maxamed Diiriye
12. Maxamed Xaaji Yuusuf Waabeeye
13. Baar Siciid Faarax
14. Axmed Yaasiin Sh. Cali Ayaanle
15. Aadan Xaaji Diiriye Dirir (Sanqoole)
16. Saleebaan Yuusuf Cali Koore
17. Axmed Maxamed Afweyne
18. Aadan Maxamed Hoori
19. Siciid Maxamed Cilmi
20. Maxamed Barkhad Miigane
21. Xuseen Maxamed Cige
22. Ibraahim Axmed Haybe
23. Maxamed Cismaan Bulqaas
24. Farxaan Maxamed Cali
25. C/qaadir Askar Xuseen
DR CONGO: ICC PROSECUTOR WARNS ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
DR CONGO: ICC PROSECUTOR WARNS ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said today he is following the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with "utmost vigilance," stating that violence related to the presidential and legislative polls later this month will not be tolerated.
"My office is gathering and carefully reviewing converging reports of both verbal and physical violence arising out of the electoral campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections on 28 November," said Luis Moreno-Ocampo in a <"http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/01965B8F-E6D6-4792-993E-8A7E7DB77B18.htm">statement issued by the ICC, which is based in The Hague, the Netherlands.
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo urged all parties in the electoral process to refrain from violence, noting that the ICC has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes committed either in the DR Congo or by Congolese nationals since 1 July 2002.
"We are keeping watch to ensure that the process does not lead to acts of violence or attacks against the civilian population. We are paying particular attention to reports of inciting hatred, exclusion and physical violence by various political figures in Kinshasa and across the entire country," he said.
"Electoral violence can result in the commission of crimes falling within our jurisdiction. No one should doubt our resolve to prevent crimes or, if need be, prosecute individuals, as we are doing in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire," he added.
He said his office has the capacity to document any crime within its jurisdiction and, in coordination with domestic courts, will take all necessary action to investigate such crimes.
The prosecutor reiterated that people alleged to have committed serious crimes, such as Bosco Ntaganda, for whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant, must be taken into custody and put on trial. Mr. Ntaganda, a former commander of armed militias in eastern DRC, is accused of playing a central role in enlisting and conscripting children below the 15 and using them in active combat.
"The electoral process should not feed a sense of impunity on the part of those responsible for such crimes. On the contrary, it should strengthen the rule of law and the fight against impunity," said Mr. Moreno-Ocampo.
A United Nations report released earlier this week detailed numerous human rights violations during the pre-electoral period in the DRC, and warns that such incidents could threaten the democratic process and result in post-electoral violence.
The joint report issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC (MONUSCO), documents 188 violations apparently linked to the electoral process that occurred between 1 November 2010 and 30 September this year.
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said today he is following the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with "utmost vigilance," stating that violence related to the presidential and legislative polls later this month will not be tolerated.
"My office is gathering and carefully reviewing converging reports of both verbal and physical violence arising out of the electoral campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections on 28 November," said Luis Moreno-Ocampo in a <"http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/01965B8F-E6D6-4792-993E-8A7E7DB77B18.htm">statement issued by the ICC, which is based in The Hague, the Netherlands.
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo urged all parties in the electoral process to refrain from violence, noting that the ICC has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes committed either in the DR Congo or by Congolese nationals since 1 July 2002.
"We are keeping watch to ensure that the process does not lead to acts of violence or attacks against the civilian population. We are paying particular attention to reports of inciting hatred, exclusion and physical violence by various political figures in Kinshasa and across the entire country," he said.
"Electoral violence can result in the commission of crimes falling within our jurisdiction. No one should doubt our resolve to prevent crimes or, if need be, prosecute individuals, as we are doing in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire," he added.
He said his office has the capacity to document any crime within its jurisdiction and, in coordination with domestic courts, will take all necessary action to investigate such crimes.
The prosecutor reiterated that people alleged to have committed serious crimes, such as Bosco Ntaganda, for whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant, must be taken into custody and put on trial. Mr. Ntaganda, a former commander of armed militias in eastern DRC, is accused of playing a central role in enlisting and conscripting children below the 15 and using them in active combat.
"The electoral process should not feed a sense of impunity on the part of those responsible for such crimes. On the contrary, it should strengthen the rule of law and the fight against impunity," said Mr. Moreno-Ocampo.
A United Nations report released earlier this week detailed numerous human rights violations during the pre-electoral period in the DRC, and warns that such incidents could threaten the democratic process and result in post-electoral violence.
The joint report issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC (MONUSCO), documents 188 violations apparently linked to the electoral process that occurred between 1 November 2010 and 30 September this year.
Op-Ed:Hacking is a criminal offence, according to the “crimes and Criminal Procedure section, Internationaly
Op-Ed:Hacking is a criminal offence, according to the "crimes and Criminal Procedure section, Internationaly
I was reading the current allegation by Qarannews against the Somaliland Foreign Minister, and I would like to comments as follows:-
We all know that Hacking some one's email is a most grievous and serious crime internationally, and publishing the contents is a more serious crime. What Qarrannes did was a treason in big way and the guy who did this should face the justice, either in Somaliland or in Britain, wherever he resides now.
The penalty of this crime ranges from 10 to 15 years, if proven guilt of malicious nature, email hacking has become a more common problem and one that both Internet service providers and law enforcement continue to fight. Because email is considered private information, email hacking can be a criminal offense and is defined as unauthorized use of an email account
Furthermore, why they did this unimaginable state of conspiracy against the Somaliland Foreign Minister? Was it personal vendetta or a high treason they willfully took, to subvert the State of Somaliland and the family of the President?
What they did is not anyway a Press Freedom, but tragic in a big way. Some of us claim that the Minister is trying to muzzle the Press. That is untrue and the current government encourages the freedom of the press in my view. I was watching a press conference made by someone who claim to represent human rights office in Somaliland, and another who is a member of the Somaliland parliament, who ignorantly defend this man. I believe both of these gentlemen have no clue of what hacking is. The minister did not say in his email that this guy is linked to a terrorism, but said the information they divulged might fall in the hands of terrorists, and that is correct. Furthermore, since this guy is a British citizen, and the crime committed falls on the jurisdiction of Scotland Yard they should investigated the culprit, whether his MP in Hargeisa likes or not.
Qarrannes has become the platform of those against the current Somaliland government, because they were the mouse piece of the former government, and the former minister of finance use to pay the money this guy runs the website [that was the speculation commonly believed in Somaliland during the Riyaale government].
My comments do not anyway support the Foreign Minister, but ethically wrong and that, a responsible person or website should not publish something like this, while knowing that the information in hand is hacked from a private email of a State Minister. To be an opposition does not mean or anyway, warrant to dig that bad in any civilized society, and in Somaliland particularly. It is unpatriotic and selfishness to say the least. There must be a limitation to press freedom and when such unprecedented event comes to light, the government has the right to go after people like Qarannews.
I still support that, a case against Qarannews should go ahead and the truth should come to light. Somaliland websites and news papers must refrain from such a crime.
Omer Hussein Dualeh
SYRIA: UN AGENCY CALLS FOR ACCESS TO REACH PEOPLE IN NEED OF RELIEF
SYRIA: UN AGENCY CALLS FOR ACCESS TO REACH PEOPLE IN NEED OF RELIEF
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) today voiced concern over shortages of food, water, electricity and medical services in Syria and requested that humanitarian agencies be allowed to go to all areas where people are in need of assistance.
The agency has not been able to carry out a full evaluation of the food situation in Syria, but plans to distribute 50,000 monthly ration packs this month, in additional to the 22,000 rations delivered in August, WFP spokesperson Gaëlle Sévenier told reporters in Geneva.
WFP has been working with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to distribute the food to some of the most vulnerable families in the country, she added. Many Syrians were already grappling with high food prices, but the situation has deteriorated for families who have lost their property in the ongoing conflict and as a result of drought.
The agency is also providing food aid to an estimated 100,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria using a text messaging system that enables people to buy rice, cheese, eggs and fresh produce, Ms. Sévenier said.
More than 3,500 people have been killed since the Syrian Government began a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in March, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
The protests are part of a wider pro-democracy movement across North Africa and the Middle East this year that has toppled long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) today voiced concern over shortages of food, water, electricity and medical services in Syria and requested that humanitarian agencies be allowed to go to all areas where people are in need of assistance.
The agency has not been able to carry out a full evaluation of the food situation in Syria, but plans to distribute 50,000 monthly ration packs this month, in additional to the 22,000 rations delivered in August, WFP spokesperson Gaëlle Sévenier told reporters in Geneva.
WFP has been working with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to distribute the food to some of the most vulnerable families in the country, she added. Many Syrians were already grappling with high food prices, but the situation has deteriorated for families who have lost their property in the ongoing conflict and as a result of drought.
The agency is also providing food aid to an estimated 100,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria using a text messaging system that enables people to buy rice, cheese, eggs and fresh produce, Ms. Sévenier said.
More than 3,500 people have been killed since the Syrian Government began a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in March, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
The protests are part of a wider pro-democracy movement across North Africa and the Middle East this year that has toppled long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
Human Rights and Parliamentarian Condemns Somaliland F Minister.
Human Rights and Parliamentarian Condemns Somaliland F Minister.
Minister's allegations are in direct contravention against the norms of civilised
Hargeisa(Sunatimes)- A press conference was this week held in Hargeisa, Somaliland by members of the Somaliland human rights umbrella group Suhuro-net and members of the Somaliland parliament to discuss the recent false allegations against Qarannews.com by the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar.
According confidential reports received from within Somaliland by Qarannews.com, minister Dr. Omar allegedly accused Qarannews.com of having ties to international terrorism and ofengaging in hacking activities. These allegations by the minister cameinto light as a result of correspondencesbetween the minister and a diplomat of the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
During the press conference, Suhuro-net spokesperson, Mr. Saleban Ismail Bulaale described the allegations by Somaliland Foreignminister, Dr. Omar against Qarannews.com as been "far-removed from reality".
Mr. Bulaale stated that the minister's allegations are in direct contravention against the norms of civilised nations and against Somaliland's constitution.
According to Mr.Bulaale, spokesperson for Suhuro-net, the minister made several errors which are beyond comprehension considering the stature of the minister and the avenues open to the minister within the Somaliland civil code of conduct.
Mr. Bulaale declared that the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar was hasty in making his allegations against Qarannews.com without concrete proof. Furthermore, the minister should have pursued the matter through the Somaliland courts instead of appealing to British Intelligence via the British embassy to investigate a journalists froman independent media because he, the minister, disagreed with the articles printed in Qarannews.com.
Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, a member of the Somaliland parliament also participated in the press conference to discuss the allegations of the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar against Qarannews.com, its staff and senior editor, Mr. Mohamed Jama.
Mr. Aw Hog stated that the whole purpose of an independent media in Somaliland is to keep the government and other state institutions accountable to the people of Somaliland.
Mr. Aw Hog emphasised that every independent media in the world has to right to provide news service to its readers and subscribers. This, declared Mr. Aw Hog, is a pillar of democracy and Somaliland is no different from any other democratic nation in the world.
The Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, has according to parliamentarian Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, the right to seek redress on any issues that he, the minister, by consider as incorrect or miss-represented, through the judicial system in Somaliland, instead of throwing around allegations of terrorism!
However, Mr. Aw Hog continued, the minister or any other serious government official should not besmirch or put in jeopardy the safety of a journalistby appealing to a foreign government, however friendly, by making baseless and ludicrous allegations.
Somaliland has a vibrant and free media, and Somaliland websites, such as Qarannews.com are visited regularly by over 50,000 readers on a daily basis spread across the globe, announced Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, and it is a sign on a progressive, democratic and accountable society, added Mr. Aw Hog.
In conclusion, Somaliland member of parliament, Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, described Qarannews.com as one of the most popular and leading websites in Somaliland and stated that the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar's allegations against Qarannews.com will have major implications against the current Somaliland government's dealing with the independent media in the country.
Mr. Aw Hog stated that he would whatever he can to advise the United Kingdom government, including the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign and Commonwealth and the British Embassy, that neither Qarannews.com, nor its staff nor its senior editor, Mr. Mohamed Jama have and or ever had any links to international terrorism or engaged in any hacking activities.
By Roda Abdi
Minister's allegations are in direct contravention against the norms of civilised
Hargeisa(Sunatimes)- A press conference was this week held in Hargeisa, Somaliland by members of the Somaliland human rights umbrella group Suhuro-net and members of the Somaliland parliament to discuss the recent false allegations against Qarannews.com by the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar.
According confidential reports received from within Somaliland by Qarannews.com, minister Dr. Omar allegedly accused Qarannews.com of having ties to international terrorism and ofengaging in hacking activities. These allegations by the minister cameinto light as a result of correspondencesbetween the minister and a diplomat of the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
During the press conference, Suhuro-net spokesperson, Mr. Saleban Ismail Bulaale described the allegations by Somaliland Foreignminister, Dr. Omar against Qarannews.com as been "far-removed from reality".
Mr. Bulaale stated that the minister's allegations are in direct contravention against the norms of civilised nations and against Somaliland's constitution.
According to Mr.Bulaale, spokesperson for Suhuro-net, the minister made several errors which are beyond comprehension considering the stature of the minister and the avenues open to the minister within the Somaliland civil code of conduct.
Mr. Bulaale declared that the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar was hasty in making his allegations against Qarannews.com without concrete proof. Furthermore, the minister should have pursued the matter through the Somaliland courts instead of appealing to British Intelligence via the British embassy to investigate a journalists froman independent media because he, the minister, disagreed with the articles printed in Qarannews.com.
Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, a member of the Somaliland parliament also participated in the press conference to discuss the allegations of the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar against Qarannews.com, its staff and senior editor, Mr. Mohamed Jama.
Mr. Aw Hog stated that the whole purpose of an independent media in Somaliland is to keep the government and other state institutions accountable to the people of Somaliland.
Mr. Aw Hog emphasised that every independent media in the world has to right to provide news service to its readers and subscribers. This, declared Mr. Aw Hog, is a pillar of democracy and Somaliland is no different from any other democratic nation in the world.
The Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, has according to parliamentarian Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, the right to seek redress on any issues that he, the minister, by consider as incorrect or miss-represented, through the judicial system in Somaliland, instead of throwing around allegations of terrorism!
However, Mr. Aw Hog continued, the minister or any other serious government official should not besmirch or put in jeopardy the safety of a journalistby appealing to a foreign government, however friendly, by making baseless and ludicrous allegations.
Somaliland has a vibrant and free media, and Somaliland websites, such as Qarannews.com are visited regularly by over 50,000 readers on a daily basis spread across the globe, announced Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, and it is a sign on a progressive, democratic and accountable society, added Mr. Aw Hog.
In conclusion, Somaliland member of parliament, Mr. Abdirahman Aw Hog, described Qarannews.com as one of the most popular and leading websites in Somaliland and stated that the Somaliland Foreign Minister, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar's allegations against Qarannews.com will have major implications against the current Somaliland government's dealing with the independent media in the country.
Mr. Aw Hog stated that he would whatever he can to advise the United Kingdom government, including the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign and Commonwealth and the British Embassy, that neither Qarannews.com, nor its staff nor its senior editor, Mr. Mohamed Jama have and or ever had any links to international terrorism or engaged in any hacking activities.
By Roda Abdi
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